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Participating Equally: Using Tax Policy to Improve 
Female Workforce and Management Participation 
in the 21st Century 
 
Katherine E. Smalley* 
 
Seeking out a more balanced life is not a women’s issue; 
balance would be better for us all.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When Nikki Waller and Joann S. Lublin presented the question “why 
aren’t there more women in the upper ranks of corporate America?” in their 
September 2015 Wall Street Journal article,2 the question appeared almost 
cliché.  With the recent revitalization, and arguable re-branding of modern 
feminism, the debate regarding female representation in the upper echelons 
of government and business continues to gain greater attention.3  While 
women have made great strides toward equality, they remain noticeably 
absent from top leadership positions,4 prompting many to seek ways to 
 
     *Associate in the Nashville, Tennessee office of Bass.  Berry & Sims PLC. B.S. 2013, 
Centre College 2013; J.D. 2016, The University of Tennessee College of Law.  
 1. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why Women Can’t Still Have It All, THE ATLANTIC, 
July/August 2012, at 100. 
 2. Nikki Waller & Joann S. Lublin, What’s Holding Women Back in the Workplace?, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 2015, at R1.  
 3. Id. (arguing one of the most vocal supporters of female leadership development is 
Facebook COO and Leanin.org founder, Sheryl Sandberg).  See also SHERYL SANDBERG, 
LEAN IN (1st ed. 2013) (a book that seeks to identify barriers to female top leadership, and 
present possible solutions to overcome those barriers).  See also About Lean In, LEANIN.ORG, 
http://leanin.org/about, (outlining Sandberg’s nonprofit “offering women the ongoing 
inspiration and support to help them achieve their goals.  If we talk openly about the 
challenges women face and work together, we can change the trajectory of women and create 
a better world for everyone”). 
 4. DEBORAH RHODE, WOMEN AND LEADERSHIP, 1 (2017) (“Despite a half century of equal 
opportunity legislation, women’s leadership opportunities are far from equal.  The most 
comprehensive survey finds that women occupy less than a fifth of senior leadership positions 
across the public and private sectors.”) (citing Colorado Women’s College, Benchmarking 
Women’s Leadership in the United States (Denver: Colorado Women’s College, 2013)).  See 
also Catalyst, Pyramid: Women in S&P 500 Companies, CATALYST (last updated Aug. 22, 
2017), http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/women-sp-500-companies (showing only 4.4% of 
S&P 500 are female).  See also Center for American Women in Politics, Women in Elective 
Office 2015, CENTER FOR AMERICAN WOMEN IN POLITICS, EAGLETON INSTITUTE OF POLITICS, 
PARTICIPATING EQUALLY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2017  3:16 PM 
56 HASTINGS WOMEN’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29:1 
promote and develop female leadership.  
But why should we, as a society, care about female leadership?  Far from 
merely benefitting one particular portion of society, enhancing and 
improving female representation in leadership positions can be beneficial for 
society as a whole.5  Although many focus on enhancing the welfare of those 
in the lower and middle classes, attention must also be paid to those residing 
in the top of the socioeconomic scale, for “it would be a grave mistake, from 
a behavioral perspective, to ignore the upper classes.”6  
Once we have determined the general utility of improving top female 
earners’ wellbeing, the question becomes: how do we improve top 
management representation?  While ignoring the need for essential changes 
in societal views on female leadership would be illogical, there is more that 
can be done to improve the pathway toward female management than merely 
relying on developing socio-normative views.  Thoughtful policy can 
provide significant momentum in the movement toward equal management 
representation.7  
Enter the Internal Revenue Code.8  The Tax Code is a powerful tool that 
can be used to promote social objectives.9  This paper seeks to demonstrate 
ways in which the Tax Code has previously influenced behavior,10 and to 
provide a possible way to use the Tax Code that would positively impact top 
female workforce representation.  
This article is set forth in three subsequent sections.  Section II proceeds 
by discussing the gendered nature of tax policy through joint filing for 
married couples and the current child and dependent care credit structure.  
This section also identifies how this gendered structure provides significant 
disincentives to those women seeking top positions.11  Section III then 
presents what I have deemed the Equal Participation Model, with equal 
monetary and nonmonetary contributions among men and women in families 
and in various sectors of the workforce.12  This model would positively 
impact not merely top-earning women, but society as a whole.13  Finally, 
Section IV presents a possible way to use the Tax Code to work toward the 
Equal Participation Model through both individual and employer 
 
RUTGERS UNIV., http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/women-elective-office-2015 (last visited Nov. 
14, 2015) (women hold approximately 20% of U.S. Congressional seats and approximately 
25% of state level elective offices).  
 5. See infra section III and accompanying footnotes.  
 6. Edward McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender 
Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983, 1028 (1993). 
 7. See infra section IV.A and accompanying footnotes.  
 8. Hereinafter the “Tax Code.” 
 9. See infra section II, IV.A, and accompanying footnotes.  
 10. See infra section II and accompanying footnotes.  
 11. Id.  
 12. See infra section III and accompanying footnotes.  
 13. Id.  
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incentives.14  While this paper does not provide all of the solutions to the 
many challenges facing women who seek top positions, it does seek to 
contribute to the ongoing conversation concerning female leadership.  
II. CURRENT GENDER IMPLICATIONS IN THE TAX CODE 
FOR HIGH ACHIEVING WOMEN 
The Tax Code has become a source of political, economic, and social 
debate, frequently suffering criticism for its treatment of certain vulnerable 
groups.15 The Tax Code’s treatment of women’s issues is no exception to 
this critique, as its impact on women has been evaluated since as early as 
1939.16 While the Tax Code has since adjusted its treatment of certain 
women’s issues,17 the current system remains a source of gender inequity 
based upon two particular elements of the Tax Code: joint filing and the 
Child and Dependent Care Credit.18  
In addition to analyzing the Tax Code’s treatment of women as a whole, 
it can also be enlightening to assess its impact upon particular segments of 
the female population to perhaps uncover further economic and social 
effects.19  In his article “Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at 
Behavioral Gender Biases in the Code,”20 Edward McCaffery identifies 
specific provisions, as well as other federal income taxation principles, and 
analyzes their effects upon three distinct sectors of the female population: 
 
 14. See infra section IV and accompanying footnotes.  
 15. See, e.g., TAXING AMERICA (Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows eds., 1996) 
(anthology of critical tax theory articles spanning subjects including racial segregation, 
income inequality treatment, and gender implications under the Tax Code); Nancy J. Knauer, 
Critical Tax Policy: A Pathway to Reform?, 9 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 206, 210 (2014) (“By 
viewing taxpayers only in terms of income level, tax policy is free to consider distributional 
issues without having to account for countervailing concerns such as gender or race equity.”). 
See generally Susan Pace Hamill, An Evaluation of Federal Tax Policy Based on Judeo-
Christian Ethics, 25 VA. TAX REV. 671 (2006); Stacey Y. Abrams, Income, Deductions and 
Wealth: A Survey of Policy Remedies to the Intersection of Color, Gender and Taxation, 28 
S.U. L. REV. 255 (2001).  
 16. See generally Smith v. Comm’r, 40 B.T.A. 1038 (1939) aff’d, 113 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 
1940); Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930); Martha T. McCluskey, Taxing the Family Work: 
Aid for Affluent Husband Care, 21 COLUM.  J. GENDER & L. 109 (2011); McCaffery, supra 
note 6; Allan J. Samansky, Child Care Expenses and the Income Tax, 50 FLA. L. REV. 245, 
259–69 (1998); Mary Louise Fellows, Rocking the Tax Code: A Case Study of Employment-
Related Child-Care Expenditures, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 307, 386 (1998); Marjorie E. 
Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A Typical Male 
Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REV. 465 (1987). 
 17. For example, the adoption of the childcare deduction and the evolution to the current 
Child and Dependent Care Deduction came as a response to the initial policies allowing 
absolutely no deductions or credits for childcare expenses arising out of full time employment 
of two spouses.  See infra section II.B and accompanying footnotes.   
 18. See infra sections II.A, II.B and accompanying footnotes.   
 19. See infra sections II.A, II.B, II.C and accompanying footnotes. 
 20. Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender 
Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983 (1993). 
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the “uppers,” the “middles,” and the “lowers.”21  McCaffery concludes that 
those women falling in the “lowers” and “uppers” categories are 
significantly more affected by the current federal income tax regime than 
those in the “middle” class.22  While national social and economic situations 
have changed since 1993,23 the reality of severe Tax Code based 
disincentives for high earning women remain.24  In fact, some critics have 
described the current systems of joint filing and childcare expense as “aid 
for affluent husband care.”25  By recognizing the inherent gender biases and 
resulting disincentives for female workforce participation, particularly 
among those women in potential top-earning positions, we can identify ways 
to reduce, if not eliminate, these impediments to the benefit of all.26  
A. JOINT FILING 
The joint filing system was implemented to address the disparity 
between community property and non-community property states 
concerning single income couples’ ability to decrease their tax liability by 
offsetting a portion of the single earner’s wages as income of the nonearning 
spouse.27  However, since its establishment in its current form in 1948,28 the 
joint filing structure has developed into a marriage penalty for dual income 
 
 21. McCaffery, supra note 20, at 1014.  
 22. Id. at 1014–15, 1020, 1028–29.  
 23.  For example, the most recent economic recession severely impacted employment 
throughout the United States and other members of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (“OECD”), driving many women to both enter into and remain 
engaged in the workforce.  See KATRIN ELBORGH-WOYTEK ET AL., INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY FUND, WOMEN, WORK, AND THE ECONOMY: MACROECONOMIC GAINS FROM 
GENDER EQUITY, 12 (2013). 
 24. The Joint Filing and Child and Dependent Care Credit system has virtually gone 
unchanged, in terms of substantive elements, since 1993.  Compare I.R.C. § 21 (1988) to 
I.R.C. § 21.  Compare § 1 (1990) to I.R.C. § 1 (2014).  
 25. Martha T. McCluskey, Taxing the Family Work: Aid for Affluent Husband Care, 21 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 109, 111 (2011).  See also Brigid Schulte, Unlike in the 1950s, there 
is no ‘typical’ U.S. family today, WASH. POST (Sept. 4, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/news/local/wp/2014/09/04/for-the-first-time-since-the-1950s-there-is-no-typical-u-s-fa 
mily/ (“And yet, despite the diversity now of U.S. families, most of the laws and policies that 
affect families’ work and life have not changed.  U.S. tax policy, the Social Security system, 
laws governing work hours, all still favor married breadwinner-homemaker families.”).  
 26. See infra sections III, IV, and accompanying footnotes. 
 27. “Adoption of these income-splitting provisions will produce substantial geographical 
equalization in the impact of the tax on individual incomes.  The impetuous enactment of 
community-property legislation by States that have long used the common law will be 
forestalled.  The incentive for married couples in common-law States to attempt the reduction 
of their taxes by the division of their income through such devices as trusts, joint tenancies, 
and family partnerships will be reduced materially.  Administrative difficulties stemming 
from the use of such devices will be diminished, and there will be less need for meticulous 
legislation on the income tax treatment of trusts and family partnerships.  In effect, these 
amendments represent the adoption of a new national system for ascertaining Federal income 
tax liability.  The adoption of these amendments will extend substantial benefits to residents 
of both community-property and common-law States.”  Revenue Act of 1948, 1948-1 C.B. 
285 (I.R.S. 1948). 
 28. Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 471, 62 Stat. 110. 
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couples and a marriage bonus for single income households.29  In his article 
Taxation and Marriage: A Reappraisal,30 Yair Listokin describes the 
theoretical underpinnings of the current joint filing structure.31  Under this 
system, the Tax Code favors couples equity32 and the progressive marginal 
rate, often to the detriment of marriage neutrality.33  
While single income couples enjoy the benefits of wider tax brackets and 
ultimately a lower marginal rate under the current joint filing structure,34 the 
current joint filing system for married couples provides a disincentive for the 
secondary earner35 to continue working.36  For potential dual income 
households, the first dollar of the secondary earner’s income will be taxed at 
 
 29. In her article, Competing Goals Amidst the “Opt-Out” Revolution, Lora Cicconi 
elaborates upon the marriage penalty and bonus structure in the Tax Code: 
Because tax rates are progressive, meaning that marginal rates increase as 
income increases, this system benefits couples with disparate incomes by 
allowing them to shift some of the income of the higher earning spouse into a 
lower tax bracket.52  In contrast, it adversely affects those with equal incomes 
because neither the joint filing brackets nor exemption levels are twice as large 
as under the single filing system; the system pushes part of the income of equal 
earning spouses into a higher marginal tax bracket than the bracket applied to 
single filers.  This result is the oft-discussed “marriage penalty.” 
Lora Cicconi, Competing Goals Amidst the “Opt-Out” Revolution: An Examination of 
Gender-Based Tax Reform in Light of New Data on Female Labor Supply, 42 GONZ. L. REV. 
257, 266 (2007); McCaffery, supra note 6, at 991 (“Whether or not there is an actual ‘marriage 
penalty’ under the general rate structure depends on the relative allocation of earnings 
between spouses: those who already have a 50-50 division receive no benefit from the deemed 
income splitting, and purely pay the price of the higher rates; for those who have a 100-0 split, 
the benefits of the split income predominate over the burden of the higher rates.  The marriage 
penalty is thus relative.”). 
 30. Yair Listokin, Taxation and Marriage: A Reappraisal, 67 TAX L. REV. 185 (2014).  
 31. Id. at 185-95.  Listokin identifies three theoretical foundations for taxation, namely 
couples equity, marriage neutrality, and progressive marginal rate taxation, and then explains 
how the current joint filing structure adheres to two of these theories: progressive marginal 
rate taxation and couples equity. 
 32. “Couples equity” is the theory that couples earning equivalent gross income as a couple 
should be taxed equally.  Id. at 187.  
 33. Id. at 188.  Listokin defines marriage neutrality as the idea that two individuals should 
be taxed the same regardless their marital status.  Id. at 187.  Listokin further proposes that 
couples equity and marriage neutrality are of equivalent importance in a modern Tax Code, 
thus both principles must “share the burden” under the most efficient and effective system.  
Id. at 194.  As Listokin identifies in his article, “high rates on secondary earners are likely 
inefficient, as secondary earners’ labor decisions are much more sensitive to taxes than 
primary earners’ labor decisions.”  Id. at 189. 
 34. McCaffery, supra note 6, at 991.   
 35. In this paper, secondary earner is defined as the spouse whose first dollar of income 
will be taxed at a higher initial marginal rate based upon the greater income of the primary 
earner.  Described another way, the primary earner is the spouse who earns more income.  
While it is not always the case that the primary earner will be the husband and the secondary 
earner will be the wife, this is likely going to be the scenario, particularly once the couple has 
children.  McCafferey, supra note 6, at 993.  
 36. Cicconi, supra note 29, at 266 (2007) (“The joint filing system, in combination with 
the progressive rate structure, creates disincentives for secondary earners to enter the labor 
force.”). 
PARTICIPATING EQUALLY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2017  3:16 PM 
60 HASTINGS WOMEN’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29:1 
a greater marginal rate than if the two earners filed separate returns.37  
Therefore, comparatively the secondary earner will have significantly fewer 
after-tax dollars than the primary earner, resulting in a “marriage penalty” 
for dual income couples with relatively equivalent incomes.  
This disparity in after-tax income is made even more pronounced among 
top-earning couples.38  For couples earning fewer total dollars, the secondary 
earner’s base marginal rate is not that much different from that of the primary 
earner.  However, the higher the primary earner’s marginal bracket, the 
higher the base bracket for the secondary earner.39  For couples with at least 
one earner in the top marginal rate, the secondary earner’s first income dollar 
will be taxed at 39.6%.40  Thus joint filing provides a particularly significant 
disincentive for secondary earner workforce participation among couples in 
top-earning brackets. 
The dual income marriage penalty, together with the fact that the vast 
majority of secondary earners are women, only serves to reinforce gender 
stereotypes in workforce participation.41  When their labor is taxed at a 
higher rate, secondary earners subtly are informed that their workforce 
participation is less valuable, and thus less desirable for society as a whole, 
encouraging these secondary earners to opt out of the labor market.42  
B. THE CHILD AND DEPENDENT CARE CREDIT 
In addition to the marriage penalty under the joint filing structure, dual 
income couples face social and financial complications when it comes to 
child care.  While social stigma surrounding the “working mother” has 
continued to dissolve, the Tax Code continues to reflect antiquated notions 
of gendered labor.43  
 
 37. Cicconi, supra note 29, at 267 (“When the secondary earner is faced with her labor 
force decision, her first dollar of income is subject to the same marginal tax rate as the primary 
earner’s last dollar of income—the exemption and lower tax rates that apply at the lower 
income levels no longer apply because they have already benefited the primary earner.”). 
 38. McCaffery, supra note 6, at 1025–29 (discussing disincentives among top-earning 
couples for secondary earner workforce participation); Cicconi, supra note 29, at 267 (“Even 
part-time work at low wage rates may be taxed at up to 35% under the current tax system if 
the primary earner places the couple in the highest tax bracket, and once social security and 
payroll taxes are included, that number can easily increase to over 50%.”); Margaret Ryznar, 
To Work, or Not to Work? The Immortal Tax Disincentives for Married Women, 13 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 921, 939 (2009) (“Professional couples who are married also 
disproportionately suffer a higher tax bill—in such cases, one spouse must also pay the 
couple’s top marginal rate on most, if not all, of her income.”). 
 39. Compare couples in which the primary earner receives $20,000 to one in which that 
earner receives $100,000.  In the $20,000 example, the top marginal rate for primary earner 
will be 15%, causing the secondary earner’s “base marginal rate” to be 15%.  For the couple 
in which the primary earner receives $100,000, the secondary earner’s “base marginal rate” 
will be 25% because that is the primary earner’s marginal rate.  See I.R.C. § 1(a).  
 40. See I.R.C. § 1(a).  
 41. Listokin, supra note 30, at 189.  
 42. Id.   
 43. “A couple fitting the stereotypical pattern in which the husband works and the wife 
does not will have a minimal marriage penalty, or even a marriage benefit, if the spouses file 
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The current Dependent Care Credit is the result of a decades-long 
evolution in female workforce participation and debate.44  First rising to 
national attention with the case Smith v. Commissioner,45 the proper 
treatment of child-care expenses for dual income couples has become a 
consistent source of debate and scholarship.46  In Smith, the Board of Tax 
Appeals held, and the Second Circuit affirmed, that expenses for child-care, 
while a necessary expense of Mrs. Smith’s income production, were not 
eligible for inclusion with the general business expense deduction because 
such expenses were primarily personal.47  Although the Smith opinion is no 
longer held in great esteem due to its blatant sexism and the growing 
prevalence of female workforce participation, this holding laid the 
foundation for the tax treatment of child-care expenses.48 
Although Congress enacted a limited deduction in 1954 for those child-
care expenses incurred for employment purposes,49 the Tax Reform Act of 
197650 and its subsequent revisions currently give a limited credit for child-
care expenses.51  The current Dependent Care Credit contains several 
similarities to the former deduction, including an “employment related 
expense” requirement for credit eligibility,52 echoing the general 
 
jointly.  However, the more the couple strays from this traditional living pattern, that is, the 
more equivalent the spouses’ incomes, the more severe their marriage penalty.”  Amy C. 
Christian, The Joint Return Rate Structure: Identifying and Addressing the Gendered Nature 
of the Tax Law, 13 J.L. & POL. 241, 303 (1997). 
 44. See infra notes 47-64 and accompanying text.  
 45. 40 B.T.A. 1038 (1939) aff’d, 113 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1940).  
 46. See generally Cicconi, supra note 29; Fellows, supra note 16; McCaffery, supra note 
6; McCluskey, supra note 16; Samansky, supra note 16. 
 47. Smith, 40 B.T.A. at 1039 (“We are not prepared to say that the care of children, like 
similar aspects of family and household life, is other than a personal concern.”). 
 48. Samansky, supra note 16, at 259–69 (1998).  See also Fellows, supra note 16, at 386 
(1998) (“By treating child-care expenditures as personal, the tax law perpetuates the economic 
exploitation, sexism, and racism that is rationalized by distinguishing between public 
production and private reproduction.”). 
 49. Samansky, supra note 16, at 260.  The 1954 childcare deduction was limited to women 
and widowers, and included a relatively strict phase out for dual income couples.  I.R.C. § 
214(a), (b)(2) (1954).  This structure reflected the Congressional bifurcation of childcare 
expenses incurred out of necessity, which were treated as a business expense, and those 
incurred out of choice, which were treated as a personal expense.  Samansky, supra note 16, 
at 260–61.  This deduction was revised in 1971 to extend greater benefits to more taxpayers; 
yet the rationale for any deduction was limited by some element of necessity and phased out 
above a certain income level.  Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, § 210, 85 Stat. 497, 
518 (incorporated in I.R.C. § 214 (1971)); see 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1918, 1965–70 (discussing 
Congress’s reasons for the 1971 revisions of § 214).  
 50. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976) (incorporated in 
I.R.C. §44A (1976)).  
 51. I.R.C. § 21. Section 21 states, “In the case of an individual for which there are 1 or 
more qualifying individuals (as defined in subsection (b)(1)) with respect to such individual, 
there shall be allowed as a credit against the tax imposed by this chapter for the taxable year 
an amount equal to the applicable percentage of the employment-related expenses (as defined 
in subsection (b)(2)) paid by such individual during the taxable year.”  Id. at § 21(a)(1) (2017).  
 52. I.R.C. § 21(b)(2) (2017).  The language in current Section 21, “amounts paid for the 
following expenses, but only if such expenses are incurred to enable the taxpayer to be 
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Congressional expectations that any tax benefits resulting from child-care 
expenses must be necessary to the taxpayer’s employment.53  Second, there 
is a specific dollar limit on the deduction or credit available to taxpayers 
under these structures.54  Additionally, the § 21 Dependent Care Credit phase 
down reflects the former § 214 phase out at certain income benchmarks.55  
Furthermore, those couples seeking to take advantage of these tax benefits 
must file jointly under both the former deduction framework and current 
credit.56  
Although the current Dependent Care Credit retained several elements 
of the pre-1976 deductions, the current credit structure reflects the 
Congressional desire to benefit low and middle-income households.57  Some 
scholars have even gone so far as to argue that the current Dependent Care 
Credit aims primarily at wealth redistribution,58 and reflects a certain level 
of progressivity.59  Although credits generally are structured to benefit 
equally all taxpayers with the same reduction in tax liability regardless of 
marginal rate, the Dependent Care Credit under Section 21 phases down 
among higher-earning individuals.60  Under this system, two secondary 
earners who must pay the same amount of after-tax dollars for dependent 
care will be treated differently by the sheer fact that one has a higher adjusted 
gross income.61  Therefore, the Dependent Care Credit provides an additional 
 
gainfully employed,” almost directly mirrors the language in former Section 214, “but only if 
such care is for the purpose of enabling the taxpayer to be gainfully employed.”  I.R.C. § 21 
(b)(2)(A); I.R.C. § 214(a) (1954).   
 53. The text of § 21 includes the qualification that deductions are allowed for child or 
dependent care expenses “only if such expenses are incurred to enable the taxpayer to be 
gainfully employed.”  I.R.C. § 21 (b)(2).  Note that even the title of § 21 qualifies deductions 
for expenses “necessary for gainful employment.”  I.R.C. § 21(emphasis added).  See also 
Samansky, supra note 16, at 260-61. 
 54. I.R.C. § 21(c); I.R.C. § 214(c) (1971).  
 55. I.R.C. § 21(a) (reducing the allowable credit by “1 percentage point for each $2,000 
(or fraction thereof) by which the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income for the taxable year 
exceeds $15,000” but not below twenty (20) percent); I.R.C. § 214(d) (1975) (beginning the 
deduction phase out at $35,000 with no deduction allowed for taxpayers with income in excess 
of $44,600).  Note that legislation has been proposed in the House of Representatives that 
would increase the amount deductible to a 50% cap and likewise increase the phase down 
percentage to 35% of the eligible expenses incurred.  H.R. 2703, 114th Cong. (2015).  
 56. I.R.C. § 21(e)(2); I.R.C. § 214 (e)(1) (1971).  
 57. “While deductions favor taxpayers in the higher marginal tax brackets, a tax credit 
provides more help for taxpayers in the lower brackets.”  S. Rep. No. 94-938, pt. 1, at 132 
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3438, 3565.  
 58. “By circumventing the progressive rate structure to allow for greater reductions in tax 
liability for lower-income taxpayers than for higher-income taxpayers, the credit appears 
more related to redistribution of wealth concerns than determining the appropriate tax base 
under an ideal accretion tax.”  Fellows, supra note 16, at 386. 
 59. Amy Dunbar and Susan Nordhauser, Is the Child Care Credit Progressive?, 44 NAT’L 
TAX J. 519 (1991) (presenting their study considering the credit structure and concluding that 
the credit is progressive).   
 60. I.R.C. § 21(a)(2).  
 61. Consider two secondary earners who, for simplicity, must each pay $1,000 in childcare 
expenses in a particular year.  The low-income taxpayer will be able to take a $350 credit, 
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disincentive for workforce participation among top-income secondary 
earners.62   
C. GENERAL IMPLICATIONS FOR HIGH ACHIEVING WOMEN 
The current joint filing system and Dependent Care Credit are two 
distinct elements of the Tax Code that impact those secondary earners in the 
top marginal tax brackets.63  First, secondary earners in top-income couples 
will feel the sting of the “marriage penalty” more severely than their lower 
earning counterparts.64  The entirety of their income will be taxed at a much 
higher base marginal rate, resulting in less after-tax income.65  Second, the 
Dependent Care Credit is designed to benefit lower and middle income 
households, and the current phase down results in fewer effective benefits 
for those top earners.66  
In addition to joint filing and dependent care credit disincentives among 
top-earning couples, secondary earners face additional unique barriers to 
workforce participation.  The first barrier is the lack of necessity; while 
necessity frequently is the deciding factor that keeps secondary earners 
working in lower earning couples,67 this necessity is not a factor driving 
higher-income secondary earners to workforce participation.  The second 
barrier is the unattractiveness of part time options for top secondary earners 
because of the few after-tax dollars as a result of high base marginal rates on 
secondary-earner income.68  Despite the fact that a notably high percentage 
of top earners operate in dual income households, the disincentive for part-
time workforce participation has the potential to push secondary earners in 
top-earning couples to opt out of workforce participation as opposed to 
 
whereas a top earner may only claim a $200 credit.  See id.  
 62. The Obama White House published a Fact Sheet setting forth the President’s tax reform 
proposals.  See Office of the Press Secretary, FACT SHEET: A Simpler, Fairer Tax Code That 
Responsibly Invests in Middle Class Families, THE WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 17, 2015), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/17/fact-sheet-simpler-fairer-tax-code-
responsibly-invests-middle-class-fami.  As the title of the publication notes, these reforms are 
focused on the improving the welfare of middle class families by increasing the maximum 
credit allowed.  (“The President’s [Obama’s] tax proposal would streamline child care tax 
benefits and triple the maximum child care credit for middle class families with young 
children, increasing it to $3,000 per child.”).  Even if these proposals were adopted, top-
income secondary earners would not benefit from these reforms because their income would 
exceed the maximum income under which the credit may apply.  
 63. See supra section II.A and accompanying footnotes.  
 64. See supra notes 28-42 and accompanying text. 
 65. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. 
 66. Fellows, supra note 16, at 386.  
 67. See Amy C. Christian, The Joint Return Rate Structure: Identifying and Addressing the 
Gendered Nature of the Tax Law, 13 J.L. & POL. 241, 289 (1997) (“Unless prompted by 
economic necessity, her return to work is generally considered discretionary.”); McCaffery, 
supra note 6, at 1019 (“simple survival creates a strong economic incentive to work among 
lower income classes”); Margaret Ryznar, To Work, or Not to Work? The Immortal Tax 
Disincentives for Married Women, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 921, 939 (2009) (“Other 
mothers need to work just to provide the basic necessities for their families.”). 
 68. McCaffery, supra note 6, at 1027-28.  
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continue working in part-time positions.69  
Furthermore, high achieving, and thus high earning, women in particular 
face an additional barrier to workforce participation as mothers.  The social 
expectation to be a “good mother,” often at the expense of direct workforce 
participation, pressures high-earning women more than their lower earning 
counterparts precisely because of their elective workforce participation.70  
While lower income secondary earners must work to maintain a certain level 
of comfort, top-income secondary earners are often criticized for neglecting 
their familial obligations for “selfish” income production outside the house.71  
In fact, the Tax Code consistently has reflected a bias in favor of necessary 
child-care expenses over elective child-care expenses.72 
Consequently, high achieving women face workforce participation 
disincentives both under the Tax Code and in society as a whole.  Although 
clearly not the sole or even primary source of female workforce opt-out, the 
Tax Code’s joint filing and Dependent Care Credit structures establish 
additional barriers to those women seeking top positions by perpetuating a 
gendered labor division between monetary and nonmonetary family 
contributions.73  
 
 69. See McCaffery, supra note 6, at 1025 (“But the tax laws by and large do not support 
this reality; they stick to a single-earner model.  The results are tax-related incentives not to 
have children, not to marry if the spousal incomes are apt to be equal, and to specialize 
between market and nonmarket production.”).  Note, however, that McCaffery recognizes 
that reality does not always reflect those incentives within the Tax Code, “[t]he fact that many 
upper-income families have resisted these incentives is testimony to the appeal of different 
familial models, as well as to the flexibility that money brings to ignore certain economic 
incentives.”  Id. at 1025. 
 70. SCOTT COLTRANE, FAMILY MAN, 25 (1996).  “According to the so called traditional 
view, it is a man’s duty to serve his family by being a breadwinner and protector, whereas a 
woman’s duty is to be a good wife and mother. More than any other cultural belief, this 
idealized notion of separate spheres for mothers and fathers shapes what it means to be a man 
or woman in our society.”  Id.  Therefore, to fulfill their role in the traditional model, potential 
top-earning mothers are incentivized to stay home and commit to full time parenting rather 
than reenter the workforce.  See id., McCaffery, supra note 6, at 1027-28.  
 71. See COLTRANE, supra, note 70, at 25; Slaughter, supra note 1 (describing women who 
step back from high pressure careers to devote more time to their family obligations, “Many 
factors determine this choice, of course.  Men are still socialized to believe that their primary 
family obligation is to be the breadwinner; women, to believe that their primary family 
obligation is to be the caregiver.  But it may be more than that.  When I described the choice 
between my children and my job to Senator Jeanne Shaheen, she said exactly what I felt: 
“There’s really no choice.”); Tyler G. Okimoto & Madeline E. Heilman, The “Bad Parent” 
Assumption: How Gender Stereotypes Affect Reactions to Working Mothers, 68 J. SOCIAL 
ISSUES 701 (2012) (finding that working mothers are often perceived as less competent parents 
only when “working out of choice.”).  
 72. 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1918, 1965–70 (discussing Congress’s reasons for the 1971 
revisions of former § 214); Smith v. Comm’r, 40 B.T.A. 1038, 1039 (1939) aff’d, 113 F.2d 
114 (2d Cir. 1940); Fellows, supra note 16, at 386; Samansky, supra note 16 at 260; see I.R.C. 
§ 214 (1954); I.R.C. § 214 (1971). 
 73. “Encouraging upper income women to stay home deprives women of powerful, and 
symbolically important, roles.”  McCaffery, supra note 6, at 1028.  
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III. THE IDEAL MODEL: EQUAL PARTICIPATION 
After identifying the inherent gender bias in the Tax Code as a reflection 
of greater gendered labor and caregiving roles in society, one must turn to 
how these structures should be altered.  By defining the ideal model, we will 
be able to identify how to achieve that model and determine the most 
efficient and effective steps toward its achievement.  While some scholars 
argue that gendered labor division is the most effective method of economic 
production and family organization,74 this model serves to perpetuate deeply 
entrenched gender stereotypes.75  Moreover, workforce and family 
participation that breaks these rooted gender stereotypes have been found to 
promote desirable outcomes.76  Therefore the most effective family structure 
should reduce, if not completely eliminate, these gender stereotypes.77  
This ideal structure, which we will define here as the Equal Participation 
Model, contemplates equal participation in all spheres of life.  It is a model 
where, in the aggregate, women and men participate equally in the individual 
family unit and in society as a whole.78  In different industries and different 
levels in each organization, men and women share equal representation. 
The Equal Participation Model contains both micro benefits in the family 
unit and macro benefits for society.  For the individual family unit, 
equalizing monetary and nonmonetary contributions between spouses helps 
to promote harmony in the household, social development for fathers, and 
positive gender ideals in children.79  Stepping away from the individual unit, 
equal male and female participation in the family unit will in turn positively 
impact gender participation in larger social structures.  More balanced male 
and female participation in top positions will positively impact education, 





 74. COLTRANE supra note 70, at 153 (explaining how “human capital theory . . . legitimizes 
separate spheres and promotes a gender-segregated division of family and market labor” using 
a neutral efficiency analysis); Joel S. Hollingsworth, Save the Cleavers: Taxation of the 
Traditional Family, 13 REGENT U. L. REV. 29 (2001) (arguing certain modifications under the 
Tax Code to minimize penalties for traditional single earner households to promote effective 
child-care).  
 75. See COLTRANE, supra note 70.  See generally Fellows, supra note 16, at 373 (describing 
the work of notable tax Scholar Henry Simons, “The stereotype of the non-working wife was 
powerful enough to let his argument pass as the equivalent of sound analytical tax policy.”). 
 76. See infra sections III.A, III.B and accompanying footnotes. 
 77. Id.  
 78. Note that this model considers participation in the aggregate, for it clearly would be 
impossible for every single family to reflect a perfect 50-50 participation split.  Even under 
this model, certain families would not reflect an equal split.  Furthermore, the Equal 
Participation Model would result logically in roughly equivalent percentages of men and 
women opting out of the workforce to engage in full time child rearing. 
 79. See infra section III.A. 
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A. BETTER FAMILIES THROUGH BALANCED MONETARY AND  
NON-MONETARY CONTRIBUTIONS  
Equal participation in the family unit envisions roughly equivalent80 
division between spouses in monetary and nonmonetary labor;81 unlike the 
traditional family model that would allocate most, if not all, monetary labor 
to the husband, while the wife performed non-monetary labor for the 
household.82  The Equal Participation Model, through its equitable labor 
allocation, benefits households in three distinct ways: First, this model 
establishes equity and harmony in the family unit by dividing income 
producing and caregiving functions equally between spouses;83 second, this 
model helps develop often overlooked and under-emphasized social skills in 
men, further strengthening spousal relationships; and finally, equal 
participation among spouses provides positive role models for children.   
Women, and mothers in particular, are the most direct beneficiaries of 
the equal participation model.  Greater equality in labor allocation in the 
family unit promotes harmony in the household.84  Roughly equivalent 
monetary contribution establishes greater equality in relationships by giving 
women more breadwinning power.  While women on average devote twice 
as much time to nonmonetary labor as their male counterparts,85 the equal 
participation model would reduce this time, allowing for more monetary 
contribution or personal time.  For high earning women in particular, greater 
equality within the family unit can help reduce the additional stress that 
arises from balancing a demanding career and family obligations.86  This 
 
 80. Theoretically such contributions would be divided exactly in half, however realistically 
it would be impossible given physical differences and practical considerations.  As Scott 
Coltrane observed in his 1987-1992 survey among “sharing couples,” labor allocation was 
usually made on an ad hoc basis without significant scheduling or forethought.  COLTRANE, 
supra note 70, at 67.  Although Coltrane identified certain inequalities even among sharing 
couples (for example, mothers generally performed more laundry duties whereas fathers 
tended to focus on external household repairs), “couples were usually happy to live with 
unbalanced tasks if they could maintain an image of cooperation and trust underlying their 
efforts.”  Id. at 65–68.  
 81. For purposes of this section, monetary labor constitutes that labor for the production of 
income, often performed outside the home.  Conversely, non-monetary labor is labor 
performed within the home for which no direct compensation is earned.  While there are 
several variations and iterations of monetary and nonmonetary labor, this division is the most 
common in modern households.  
 82. COLTRANE, supra note 70, at 25 (“Kind and gentle women are supposed to stay home 
to care for children and family, allowing bold and aggressive men to venture out into the 
competitive worlds of work, politics and war.”).  
 83. See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text. 
 84. Ryznar, supra note 67, at 938 (“One commentator has noted that, in fact, equally 
financially dependent spouses are more likely to be equally committed spouses.”).  
 85. THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012, 19 (2012). 
 86. See Debra L. Nelson and Ronald J. Burke, Women Executives: Health, Stress, and 
Success, 14 EXECUTIVE HEALTH 107,112–13 (2000) (identifying the discrepancy between the 
total workload experienced by executive men and women, leading to increased overall stress 
for female executives and further highlighting the greater risk for anxiety and depression 
among executive women resulting from work-family conflict); Slaughter, supra note 1 
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stress reduction can improve female executive health and wellbeing by 
reducing anxiety and depression triggers than can lead to more serious health 
concerns over time.87 
In addition to benefitting women through enhanced market participation 
and relief from some domestic responsibilities, the Equal Participation 
Model serves men and fathers by developing essential social and caregiving 
skills.88  In particular, caregiving has been shown to increase fathers’ 
sensitivity and social development.89  Caregiving participation has also been 
shown to improve men’s health90 and effectiveness in their monetary labor.91  
Moreover, reduction in out-of-home working hours may also lead to 
enhanced workplace performance.92  
By enhancing male sensitivity and increasing female empowerment 
through employment, the equal participation model can strengthen 
marriages.93  Increased male sensitivity through childcare helps improve 
communication and commitment in the marriage, and female employment 
helps establish equal income producing roles in the marriage.94  Furthermore, 
roughly equivalent monetary and non-monetary labor provides similar 
 
(identifying how more balanced scheduling and sharing within the family unit can help those 
women seeking to attain top careers while maintaining family obligations).    
 87. See Nelson & Burke, supra note 86, at 113, 116–17. 
 88. COLTRANE, supra note 70, at 76–80.  See also infra notes 89–97 and accompanying 
text.  
 89. COLTRANE, supra note 70, at 76–77.  “Recognition of increased sensitivity on the part 
of the fathers, and their enhanced competence as parents, were typically evaluated with 
reference to adopting a vocabulary of motives and feelings similar to the mothers.’”  Id. at 77.  
 90. Julianne Holt-Lunstad, Ph.D., Wendy Birmingham, M.S., Adam M. Howard, B.S., & 
Dustin Thoman, Ph.D., Married With Children: The Influence of Parental Status and Gender 
on Ambulatory Blood Pressure, 38 ANNALS OF BEHAVIORAL MEDICINE 170, 176 (2010).  This 
study revealed significantly lower blood pressure among parents, though this difference was 
more pronounced among women.  Id.  
 91. Jamie J. Ladge, Beth K. Humberd, Marla Baskerville Watckins, & Grad Harrington, 
Updating the Organization Man: An Examination of Involved Fathering in the Workplace, 29 
THE ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVES 152, 165 (2015) (“We find that spending more 
time with their children during the workday is related to many important work outcomes for 
fathers that can have a positive impact on organizations.”). 
 92. Gary Siniscalco, Lauri Damrell, & Clara Morain Nabity, The Pay Gap, The Glass 
Ceiling, and Pay Bias: Moving Forward Fifty Years After the Equal Pay Act, 29 ABA J. LAB. 
& EMP. L. 395, 414–17 (“numerous studies show that long hours do not necessarily enhance 
the bottom line or equate to success”). 
 93. COLTRANE, supra note 70, at 78–79; Katherine Twamley, Ginny Brunton, Katy 
Sutcliffe, Kate Hinds, & James Thomas, Fathers’ Involvement and the Impact on Family 
Mental Health: Evidence from Millennium Cohort Study Analyses, 16 COMMUNITY, WORK & 
FAMILY 212, 217–18 (2013) (finding a positive correlation between father involvement in 
child-caregiving and overall family mental well-being).  In fact, research has shown that 
couples “who spend more time on household labor report more frequent sex.  Even after 
controlling for time spent in paid labor, the positive association between hours spent on 
housework with sexual frequency remains, and paid work hours are also positively associated 
with sexual frequency.”  Constance T. Gager and Scott T. Yabiku, Who Has the Time? The 
Relationship Between Household Labor Time and Sexual Frequency, 31 JOURNAL OF FAMILY 
ISSUES 135, 156 (2010).  
 94. COLTRANE, supra note 70, at 78.  
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responsibilities, expectations, and considerations in the family unit.95  
Although female workforce participation was once blamed for increasing 
divorce rates and family instability, recent scholarship actually has 
concluded that such trends have significantly declined, if not ceased 
altogether.96  
Finally, children can benefit from the equal participation model because 
they are able to observe positive gender role models and receive diverse 
caregiving from two parents.97  Generally speaking, “[t]he involvement of 
men in child care . . . influences the socialization of children into gender roles 
and family formation processes, including gendered divisions of labor in the 
next generation of families.”98  Studies consistently have found positive 
correlations between paternal involvement and child wellbeing.99  For 
example, daughters who observe more egalitarian domestic and workforce 
participation among parents are more likely to aspire towards careers apart 
from traditional gender roles.100   
Within the family unit, the Equal Participation Model mirrors the 
growing social roles of fathers and mothers sharing duties of both caregiving 
and economic production for the household.101  As Jill Yavorksy identifies 
in her article The Production of Inequality: The Gender Division of Labor 
 
 95. COLTRANE, supra note 70, at 79.  
 96. Bisakha Sen, Does Married Women’s Market Work Affect Marital Stability Adversely? 
An Intercohort Analysis Using NLS Data, 60 REVIEW OF SOCIAL ECONOMY Vol. 1, 71, 87 
(Mar. 2002) (finding that current trends show greater family stability when both spouses work, 
and concluding that the data “impl[ies] that further economic opportunities for women will 
not be detrimental to familial stability, and hence should not be discouraged”).  
 97. See infra notes 99–101 and accompanying text.  
 98. Scott Coltrane, Gender Theory and Household Labor, 63 SEX ROLES 791, 796 (2010) 
(hereinafter Coltrane, Gender Theory).  See also Scot M. Allgood, Troy E. Beckert, & Camille 
Peterson, The Role of Father Involvement in the Perceived Psychological Well-Being of 
Young Adult Daughters: A Retrospective Study, 14 NORTH AMERICAN JOURNAL OF 
PSYCHOLOGY 95, 98 (2012) (“greater father participation in child rearing was associated with 
less stereotypical views of gender roles”).  
 99. Twamley et al., supra note 93, at 216 (citing several studies, “There appears to be a 
positive correlation between fathers’ involvement in childcare and children’s wellbeing.”); 
Allgood, supra note 98, at 98 (noting studies demonstrating that daughters’ greater self-
esteem is positively correlated with father involvement).  
 100. Alyssa Croft, Toni Schmader, Katharina Block, and Andrew Scott Baron, The Second 
Shift Reflected in the Second Generation: Do Parents’ Gender Roles at Home Predict 
Children’s Aspirations?, 25 PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 1418, 1426 (2014) (“children’s explicit 
beliefs about gender differences in domestic labor were predicted by the same beliefs held by 
their mothers, as well as by their fathers’ tendency to self-stereotype as more work oriented 
than family oriented.  But for daughters, in particular, a tendency to self-stereotype as more 
family than work oriented in the future was uniquely predicted by their parents’ beliefs and 
behaviors.  Specifically, girls were more likely to envision themselves as working outside the 
home when their fathers reported more gender-egalitarian beliefs about domestic labor, but 
also when their mothers reported doing relatively less domestic work and self-stereotyped as 
more work oriented.  Over and above explicit gender-role beliefs, however, fathers’ actual 
division of labor and implicit gender-role associations played a key role in predicting 
daughters’ occupational aspirations.”). 
 101. Jill Yavorksy et al., The Production of Inequality: The Gender Division of Labor 
Across the Transition to Parenthood, 77 J. MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 662, 663–64 (2015).  
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Across the Transition to Parenthood, “Cultural conceptualizations of 
fatherhood have progressed from a sole focus on economic responsibilities 
to expectations that fathers be directly involved in the care of their children 
and form close, emotional ties to their children . . . At the same time, 
mothers’ roles have expanded to include economic responsibilities.”102  
However, as Yavorsky identifies later in her article, actual household labor 
distribution has not completely caught up with these changing social 
conceptualizations.103 
B. BETTER BUSINESS THROUGH EQUAL FEMALE MANAGEMENT 
PARTICIPATION 
Stepping back from the benefits of equal labor allocation in the home, 
the Equal Participation Model seeks gender balance in the greater social and 
economic structures.  While equal workforce participation has become a 
virtual reality, women are noticeably absent from top management 
positions.104  The Equal Participation Model seeks equal female management 
at all levels because it would establish additional role models for future high 
achieving women and result in more effective decision making through 
leadership diversity.105 
First, it is important to identify how exposure to women in top leadership 
positions helps to initiate and perpetuate growing female workforce 
participation and aspiration.  Role models help inspire young women to reach 
toward high achieving careers.106  This inspiration, in turn, perpetuates a 
cycle of higher achievement and further aspiration outside of traditional 
 
 102. Yavorksy et al., supra note 101, at 663. 
 103. Id. at 675 (finding that mother spend approximately 8 more hours working, including 
both paid economic production and unpaid household labor, than fathers following the 
transition to parenthood). 
 104. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, WOMEN, WORK, AND THE ECONOMY: 
MACROECONOMIC GAINS FROM GENDER EQUITY, 4 (2013); supra note 24 and accompanying 
text. 
 105. Kimberly Weisul, Women on boards: Are Quotas really the Answer?, FORTUNE (Dec. 
5, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/12/05/women-on-boards-quotas/; Ruth Sullivan, Can 
Gender Quotas Get More Women Into Boardrooms?, BLOOMBERG.COM (July 1, 2015) 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-01/can-gender-quotas-get-more-women-
into-boardrooms-; see RHODE, supra note 4, at 3 (“For effective performance in an 
increasingly competitive and multicultural environment, workplaces need individuals with 
diverse backgrounds, experienced, and styles of leadership.”). 
 106. Lori Beaman, Esther Duflo, Rohini Pande, and Petia Topalova researched how women 
village leaders in India affected adolescent female future aspirations. Lori Beaman, Esther 
Duflo, Rohini Pande, & Petia Topalova, Female Leadership Raises Aspirations and 
Educational Attainment for Girls: A Policy Experiment in India, 335 SCIENCE MAGAZINE 582, 
582-83 (Feb. 3, 2012).  They found that successive female leaders eliminated the aspiration 
gap between boys and girls in terms of educational and career goals, concluding, “It is their 
presence as positive role models for the younger generation that seems to underlie observed 
changes in aspirations and educational outcomes of adolescent girls.” Id. at 586; Joann Lublin, 
How Companies are Different When more Women are in Power, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2016 
(quoting Robin Ely) (“The more women who are in positions of power visibly, the better it is 
for women lower in the organization.’’). 
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gender roles and stereotypes.107  Therefore, steps toward equal participation 
would empower female leadership.  
In addition to the specific value for women, society as a whole will 
benefit from equal female management participation.108  It is generally 
accepted that women frequently display a distinct leadership style from that 
of their male counterparts.109  Studies have previously found that women 
have a tendency to display what has been described as a “transformational” 
and “interactive” leadership style, focusing more on consensus and 
development as opposed to the traditional male “transactional” approach.110  
These styles encouraged participation and consciously strove to develop self-
worth among all participants in the enterprise, ultimately strengthening 
group identity.111  
Alongside improving workplace satisfaction, female management has 
also proven effective through enhanced performance of companies with 
female CEOs.112  While not all companies led by women display improved 
performance, expanding research on this subject reflects a general trend 
where female directed Fortune 1000 Companies produced 226% better 
equity returns than the S&P 500 during the years 2002-2014.113  Similarly, 
female politicians have been cited as more effective than their male 
counterparts in the performance of certain functions in the political 
process.114  
 
 107. Female Leadership at 584 (“By the second cycle of female leadership, the gender gap 
in educational outcomes is completely erased (and even reversed), and girls spend less time 
on household activities….”).  
 108. Booz & Company, Empowering the Third Billion: Women and the World of Work in 
2012, 21 (2012) (“This is perhaps the most noteworthy conclusion of our research—the 
economic advancement of women doesn’t just empower women but also leads to greater 
overall prosperity . . . economically empowering women is the key to greater societal gains.”). 
 109. Cheryl de la Rey, Gender, Women and Leadership, 65 AGENDA: EMPOWERING WOMEN 
FOR GENDER EQUITY 4, 5 (2005).  Although de la Rey addresses the debate concerning 
whether women in fact reflect a distinctive leadership style, she points out that the majority 
of scholars agree with the assertion that women leaders do display characteristics that set them 
apart from their male colleagues.  Id. 
 110. Judy B. Rosener, Ways Women Lead, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov./Dec. 1990). 
 111. Id. (“[T]he women encourage participation, share power and information, enhance 
other people’s self-worth, and get others excited about their work.”); see RHODE, supra note 
4, at 5–6 (discussing use of a transformational leadership style among women leaders). 
 112. See infra notes 114–15 and accompanying text; Caroline Fairchild, Women CEOs in 
the Fortune 1000: By the numbers, FORTUNE (July 8, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/07/08/ 
(noting that “[o]nly 5% of Fortune 1000 companies have female CEOs, but those giants 
generate 7% of the Fortune 1000’s total revenue” and “Fortune 1000 companies with female 
chiefs outperformed the S&P 500 index over their respective tenures”).  
 113. Pat Wechsler, Women-led Companies Perform Three Times Better than the S&P 500, 
FORTUNE (Mar. 3, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/03/03/women-led-companies-perform-
three-times-better-than-the-sp-500/.  
 114. See Tony Dokoupil, Why Female Politicians are More Effective, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 22, 
2011), http://www.newsweek.com/why-female-politicians-are-more-effective-66889 (stating 
that female politicians were noticeably more effective in the introduction and sponsorship of 
federal bills than male politicians, and those bills were considered most important among the 
bills introduced, ultimately suggesting that women were better politicians than men).  
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Thus the Equal Participation Model would benefit not only the female 
portion of the population through increased representation and the 
establishment of beneficial role models, but also society as a whole through 
enhanced performance in several fields through uniquely leadership 
techniques.115  Moreover, reduction in out of home working hours may also 
lead to enhanced workplace performance for both male and female 
employees as a result of more effective working hours.116 
IV. ACHIEVING THE IDEAL MODEL 
Once the equal participation ideal has been identified, the question 
becomes how to achieve this model.  While abolishing the glass ceiling will 
require significant social and psychological evolution, there are ways to 
implicitly propel this evolution through tax policy.117  Achieving equal 
participation can be advanced through tax policy in the form of individual 
and employer centered policies.  Individual policies include individual filing 
and enhanced childcare deductions for dual income households at all income 
levels.118  At the employer level, it would be beneficial to introduce policies 
incentivizing flextime for all employees and female workplace advancement 
initiatives.119  
A. THE TAX CODE AS A MODE OF SOCIAL CHANGE 
Sociologists have studied the relationship between social policy and 
gender roles for many decades.120  In his brief article Gender Theory and 
Household Labor, Scott Coltrane provides a succinct schematic of the 
various underlying conditions and causal connections that impact gender 
stratification.121  Coltrane suggests that policy, gender ratios among elites, 
and changes in gender resources can influence gender stratification in a 
society.122  In short, policy undoubtedly will impact behavior, and tax policy 
is no exception.123  
 
 115. See supra section III.B and accompanying footnotes; Nelson, supra note 86, at 119 
(“interventions aimed at increasing women’s opportunities and career development, providing 
flexibility at work, and instituting work-family programs can benefit both women and 
organizations”). 
 116. See Siniscalco et al., supra note 92, at 414–17 (“numerous studies show that long hours 
do not necessarily enhance the bottom line or equate to success”). 
 117. See infra section IV.B and accompanying footnotes.  
 118. See infra section IV.B.1 and accompanying footnotes. 
 119. See infra section IV.B.2 and accompanying footnotes.  
 120. See Coltrane Gender Theory, supra note 98, at 794–99.  
 121. Id. at 794–99.  
 122. Id. at 795.  
 123. See id. (This phenomenon has been described, “government leaders have . . . levers 
they can pull to economically empower their female citizens. . . .  Countries that do so are 
producing results.”); Booz & Company, supra note 108, at 6 (“[T]here is a clear correlation 
between the front end processes and policies regarding women’s economic opportunities 
(inputs) and the actual success of women in their national economies (outputs).”); Ryznar, 
supra note 67, at 934–35 (observing “the inordinate power of the tax code as a policy tool”); 
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While some scholars would argue that the Tax Code should not seek to 
achieve certain policy objectives or modify behavior, it remains a fact that 
the Tax Code will affect taxpayer decisions.124  Although the social and 
psychological effects of tax policy may not be apparent at first blush, the 
implicit and subconscious effects of these policies ultimately will impact 
behavior.125  Therefore it is not only efficient, but also effective to use the 
Tax Code to positively impact gender workforce participation and social 
stereotypes.  
B. POLICY PROPOSALS TO ACHIEVE THE EQUAL PARTICIPATION 
MODEL 
The Tax Code can effect positive change in gender stratification through 
amendments both at the individual and employer level.  For the individual 
taxpayer, the Tax Code can be friendlier to secondary earners through 
mandatory individual filing and an improved child-care deduction scheme.126  
The Tax Code can provide further policy improvements to gender 
stratifications by providing employer incentives for universal flextime and 
female leadership and advancement.127  These policies will improve 
secondary earner workforce participation, particularly among women in high 
achieving, high earning professions.  
1. For Individuals 
The two primary disincentives for secondary earner workforce 
participation arise out of the joint filing model of marriage taxation and the 
Dependent Care Credit.128  By adopting mandatory individual filing, the Tax 
Code would reduce, if not eliminate, the current marriage penalty for dual 
income households while reducing the marginal rate of secondary earners.129  
By reforming the Dependent Care Credit, top secondary earners will benefit 
equally by this policy.130  
a. Individual Filing 
Individual filing for married couples would vastly improve marriage 
neutrality in the Tax Code.131  While couples’ equity is another worthwhile 
 
see Slaughter, supra note 1 (“I would hope to see commencement speeches that finger 
America’s social and business policies, rather than women’s level of ambition, in explaining 
the dearth of women at the top.”). 
 124. See supra note 123.  
 125. Coltrane, Gender Theory, supra note 98, at 795 (identifying that policies are one of the 
many factors influencing gender stratification).  
 126. See infra section IV.B.1 and accompanying footnotes. 
 127. See infra section IV.B.2 and accompanying footnotes. 
 128. See supra section II and accompanying footnotes.  
 129. See infra section IV.B.1.a and accompanying footnotes.  
 130. See infra section IV.B.1.b and accompanying footnotes.  
 131. Listokin, supra note 30, at 189.  Listokin argues that neutrality is desirable under the 
Tax Code because “A system of marriage taxation that is marriage neutral does not alter 
incentives to marry, enhancing efficiency.  Marriage neutrality also ensures that labor/leisure 
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principle in tax policy, and is the principle favored under our current joint 
filing structure,132 marriage neutrality is more desirable in modern society.133  
Indeed, many of the income shifting reasons for Congress’s current joint 
filing rate structure are not as prevalent in modern society, and in fact should 
be discouraged to achieve the Equal Participation Model.134  
Joint filing eliminated the incentives for couples with large income 
discrepancies to split income and reduce tax liability.  In the Equal 
Participation Model, this income discrepancy is, in an ideal scenario, 
completely eliminated so that the incomes of both spouses are essentially the 
same.135  Therefore the Tax Code should seek to reduce income discrepancy 
between spouses, which can be achieved through individual filing because 
tax liability of couples would be lowest when each earns roughly equivalent 
income.136  By improving marriage neutrality in the Tax Code, there will be 
fewer disincentives for secondary earner opt-out, thus increasing secondary 
earner, and thus female, workforce participation.137  
 
 
trade-offs are unaffected by the system of marriage taxation.  Marriage neutrality also embeds 
the equitable principle that marriage should not change someone’s tax liability.”  Id. at 191.  
 132. Id. at 188 (“From 1948 through the present day, the Code has prioritized progressive 
marginal rates and couples equity.”).  
 133. Id. at 188–91.  Listokin argues that marriage neutrality and couples equity are equally 
desirable, which, although persuasive, is not the case when looking at policy used to effect 
social change in gender roles.  Id. at 192.  Listokin justifies his marriage taxation model, 
“Rather than coping with the trilemma by disfavoring some taxpayers but not others, 
taxpayers behind a veil of ignorance should prefer to share the burdens of the trilemma 
more equally.”  Id. at 194.  While couples equity is a worthwhile principle, it does not 
provide a strong enough justification in light of the significant joint filing disincentives for 
female secondary earners; see supra section II.A and accompanying footnotes.  Moreover, 
most modern families do not follow the same single income structure that was common 
when the joint filing system was first introduced.  See also Brigid Schulte, Unlike in the 
1950s, there is no ‘typical’ U.S. family today, WASH. POST (Sept. 4, 2014) https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/news/local/wp/2014/09/04/for-the-first-time-since-the-1950s-there-
is-no-typical-u-s-family/.  
 134. Listokin, supra note 30, at 190–91.  Listokin states: “Joint filing eliminates the 
incentive to engage in specious transactions or otherwise undesirable legal changes in an 
attempt to minimize the total tax liability of a married couple.  Joint filing also obviates the 
need to allocate income from communal property to one spouse or the other, an unavoidably 
byzantine process.”  Id. at 190–91. 
 135. See supra section III.A and accompanying footnotes.   
 136. In an individual filing system, consider couples AB and CD in which A earns $40,000, 
B earns $0, C earns $20,000 and D earns $20,000 before taxes.  Using the rates under § 1(c), 
C and D will both be taxed at a rate of 15%, resulting in $3,000 tax liability each and a total 
after tax income of $34,000 to CD.  See I.R.C. § 1(c).  Under those same brackets, A will be 
assessed taxes of $3,315, plus 28% of A’s income over $22,000 ($5,012), resulting in a total 
AB after tax income of $31,673.  See id.  Recognize that these calculations are rudimentary 
and are intended for illustration purposes only. 
 137. INT’L MONETARY FUND, WOMEN, WORK, AND THE ECONOMY: MACROECONOMIC GAINS 
FROM GENDER EQUITY, 13 (2013); INT’L MONETARY FUND, FISCAL POLICY AND EMPLOYMENT 
IN ADVANCED AND EMERGING ECONOMIES, 24–25 (2012) (presenting empirical studies 
showing overall greater female workforce participation elasticity and demonstrating that tax 
relief for women and secondary earners would stimulate workforce participation). 
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While optional filing would be a more politically feasible alteration of 
the current filing structure, achieving the Equal Participation Model would 
require a more radical approach such as mandatory individual filing.  
Optional individual filing such as that proposed in the late 1990s Marriage 
Tax Elimination Act138 would present only a marriage bonus, without any 
penalty for couples with large income discrepancies.139  To achieve the Equal 
Participation Model, policies favoring dual income households over single 
income households would need to be adopted.  Furthermore, optional 
individual filing would be economically undesirable because it would only 
reduce married couples’ tax burden without any structural alterations to 
make up that lost revenue.140  However politically undesirable, mandatory 
individual filing would be a significant step towards increasing secondary 
earner workforce participation, leading towards the Equal Participation 
Model.  
Although moderate reforms in which dual-earning couples with roughly 
equivalent incomes receive a lesser marriage penalty than under the current 
joint filing scheme are appealing and more politically feasible,141 they would 
not be an effective step toward equal participation.  Similarly, proponents of 
a secondary earner credit would not further the goals of the Equal 
Participation Model because they often favor those in lower income brackets 




 138. Marriage Tax Elimination Act, H.R. 2456, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997); Marriage Tax 
Elimination Act, S. 1314, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997).  
 139. The Marriage Tax Elimination Act provided optional individual filing for married 
couples under § 1(c) in addition to joint filing under § 1(a).  Marriage Tax Elimination Act, 
H.R. 2456, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997); Marriage Tax Elimination Act, S. 1314, 105th Cong. § 2 
(1997).  This reform would have only eliminated the marriage penalty for dual income 
couples, while single income couples would still be eligible for the joint filing marriage bonus.  
See Marriage Tax Elimination Act, H.R. 2456, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997); Marriage Tax 
Elimination Act, S. 1314, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997). 
 140. Cicconi, supra note 29, at 285 (“[A]n optional single filing system would be very 
costly, because it would eliminate the marriage penalty while retaining the marriage bonus”). 
 141. Although a proposal such as Listokin’s reformed § 1(d) married filing separately does 
provide significant relief for dual income couples, achieving the Equal Participation Model 
requires an elimination of any marriage penalty for dual income couples, if not a marriage 
bonus for those households.  Listokin, supra note 31, at 199–200.  Other scholars have 
essentially ruled out joint filing as a politically feasible alternative in the United States and 
thus turned to other sources of reform to help alleviate secondary earner bias in the Tax Code.  
E.g., Cicconi, supra note 20, at 290 (proposing a secondary earner credit); Office of the Press 
Secretary, supra note 62 (proposing dependent care credit expansion). 
 142. Cicconi presents a “secondary earner work expense credit” available to all secondary 
earners for all expenses related to entering the workforce, including childcare.  Cicconi, supra 
note 29, at 293–94.  Cicconi’s proposal phases out starting at incomes above $25,000, 
resulting in no available credit for dual income couples earning more than $105,000.  Id.  
Similarly, the White House Fact Sheet also focuses on expanding dependent care credit 
availability to lower and middle income households.  Office of the Press Secretary, supra note 
62.  
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Mandatory individual filing would shift the Tax Code’s preference away 
from couples’ equity towards a marriage neutral system.143  This reform 
would significantly reduce secondary earner labor disincentives through 
lower marginal rates for secondary earner income.  The impact would be felt 
most by those with higher incomes because they feel the marriage penalty 
most severely.144  Overall, reduction of secondary earner workforce 
participation disincentives, especially among top earners, would make 
significant strides towards the goal of equal participation.  
b. Child and Dependent Care Credit Reform 
Alongside mandatory individual filing, the Tax Code can further 
promote the Equal Participation Model by reforming the current Child and 
Dependent Care Credit to benefit top earners in addition to those in lower 
and middle brackets. President Obama’s proposal to reform the Dependent 
Care Credit, while effective in alleviating burdens on lower and middle-
income families through increased access to the credit and amount available 
under the credit, does not address the additional disincentives for top-income 
secondary earners.145  Even though adopting a childcare deduction would be 
the most effective in reducing top earner workforce participation 
disincentives, itemized deductions such as childcare expenses tend to benefit 
top earners more significantly than their lower income counterparts.146  The 
Dependent Care Credit therefore should remain a credit, but the current 
phase down for top earners should be eliminated to reduce top-income 
secondary earner disincentives to workforce participation.  
Reforms to the Dependent Care Credit should incorporate an elimination 
of the current phase down and an increase in the credit value available to 
reflect current childcare costs. Elimination of the current phase down would 
reduce progressivity,147 making this credit available for top earners in the 
same amount as their lower earning counterparts.148  The prior White House 
 
 143. Listokin, supra note 30, at 189.  
 144. See supra section II.A and II.C and accompanying footnotes.  
 145. Office of the Press Secretary, supra note 62.  One key goal of President Obama’s 
proposal is to make the Tax Code more simple and fair for middle income families.  Id.  One 
method to accomplish this goal is to “[s]treamline child care tax incentives to give middle-
class families with young children a tax cut of up to $3,000 per child.”  Id.  
 146. In fact, the current system was adopted in 1976 as a reformed version of the dependent 
care credit.  See supra notes 49-62 and accompanying text.  The change from a deduction to 
a credit arose out of critiques of the deduction’s regressive nature.  Id.; S. Rep. No. 94-938, 
pt. 1, at 132 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3438, 3565 (describing the credit’s 
benefits for lower and middle income households). 
 147. Fellows, supra note 16, at 386 (“By circumventing the progressive rate structure to 
allow for greater reductions in tax liability for lower-income taxpayers than for higher-income 
taxpayers, the credit appears more related to redistribution of wealth concerns than 
determining the appropriate tax base under an ideal accretion tax.”). 
 148. Fellows, supra note 16, at 386. (“Another reason for favoring a deduction that is not 
limited either by the income level of the taxpayer or the amount spent for employment-
related childcare concerns the tax inequity created by the exclusion of childcare services, 
performed in the home by parents, from the tax base, and the class, gender, and race 
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proposal to increase Dependent Care Credit available for lower and middle 
income households would alleviate some of these pressures, the continuation 
of the phase-down at incomes exceeding $120,000 would still preclude a 
significant portion of top-income couples from taking advantage of the 
credit.149  However, the additional pressures on high income secondary 
earners requires credit availability for those families to provide incentives to 
continue workforce participation.  This proposal reflects fairness because 
childcare expenses are no less expensive for top earners.150  
In addition to the elimination of the Credit’s phase down, there are 
several other changes that could be introduced to more accurately reflect 
expenses while simultaneously providing necessary limitations on the 
available credit.  First, the applicable percentage of the demonstrable 
expenses credited should be increased to more accurately mirror the costs of 
secondary earner workforce participation.151  However, to maintain 
reasonable restrictions on the Dependent Care Credit, the current cap on 
allowable credit amount would remain to avoid a bias in favor of top earners 
who chose to spend more on childcare.152  This cap should be increased to 
more accurately reflect the current costs of childcare, and should be re-
evaluated regularly to assure adequacy.153  
This reformed Child and Dependent Care Credit would only be available 
to the lesser income spouse.  By allocating the credit to this earner in the 
household, this policy would provide further incentives for equal workforce 
participation.  Single parent households would be eligible for the reformed 
credit because they will incur the same childcare expenses as dual income 
couples.  Childless dual income couples would be eligible for a reduced 
credit under this same section, a credit roughly attributable to the costs 
 
implications of that exclusion.”). 
 149. Office of the Press Secretary, supra note 62.  
 150. While it may be argued that top earners have more disposable income to spend on 
childcare, progressive marginal rates and increased labor hours for elite careers would reduce 
the available childcare funds while at the same time increasing childcare expenses.  
Eliminating the Dependent Care Credit phase down would reduce the effects of other 
progressive elements of the Tax Code for secondary earners (primarily women) in top-
earning, elite professions.  As explained above, it is desirable to increase female participation 
in these elite professions, as they remain the primary area of female underrepresentation.  
 151. Under current § 21, taxpayers can claim a credit of up to 35% of the cost of 
employment-related expenses.  I.R.C. § 21(a)(2) (2007).  
 152. I.R.C. § 21(c) (2007).  
 153. The average annual cost of infant care ranges from approximately $4,000 to $17,000 
across the states.  CHILD CARE AWARE OF AMERICA, PARENTS AND THE HIGH COST OF 
CHILDCARE: 2015 Rᴇᴘᴏʀᴛ, 30 (2015).  Unfortunately President Obama’s proposal would not 
sufficiently increase the available credit in a majority of states.  See Office of the Press 
Secretary, supra note 62 (this proposal would increase the available credit to $3,000).  A more 
adequate credit increase would raise the available credit to be closer to the national average, 
and ideally vary by state based upon the state’s average childcare cost for children of a given 
age.  See CHILD CARE AWARE OF AMERICA, PARENTS AND THE HIGH COST OF CHILDCARE: 2015 
Rᴇᴘᴏʀᴛ, 30 (2015). 
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associated with workforce participation.154  However, single income, dual 
parent households would not be eligible for the reformed credit, to further 
reflect actual childcare expenses and further incentivize dual income 
households.  Reforming the Child and Dependent Care Credit by eliminating 
the phase down, increasing the allowable percentage credit allowed, and 
shifting this credit to the lower income spouse in the individual filing model 
would further the goals of the Equal Participation Model.  
2. Employer Incentives 
In addition to incentives aimed directly toward taxpayers through 
individual filing and enhanced secondary earner dependent care credits, the 
Equal Participation Model would be furthered by employer related policies 
including: flextime and childcare assistance incentives for all employees and 
female leadership incentives.  
The first prong of employer directed policies includes incentivizing 
flextime employment for all employees.  While flextime employment has 
been primarily directed towards female labor, encouraging flextime for all 
employees would reflect current trends in family/work mindsets.155  
Increased flextime for women would improve female workforce 
participation,156 and flextime options for men could also improve their 
workplace contributions and job satisfaction.157  More specifically, 
improved, no fault flextime options for women could improve their ability 
to attain top careers, because their advancement would not be as hindered by 
family obligations.158  Increasing flextime would not only encourage equal 
family participation in households, but also may potentially improve 
workforce productivity.159 
 
 154. See Office of the Press Secretary, supra note 62 (this would mirror the $500 secondary 
earner credit under President Obama’s proposal). 
 155. Ladge et al., supra note 91, at 154.  Ladge identifies how current workforce 
expectations conflict with growing desires among fathers to participate in childcare.  Id.  
 156. INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 137; Booz & Company, supra note 108, at 62. 
 157.  Ladge et al., supra note 91, at 165 (“Yet our research suggests that it may actually hurt 
organizations to not support involved fathering. We find that spending more time with their 
children during the workday is related to many important work outcomes for fathers that can 
have a positive impact on organizations . . .  Thus, it appears to be in the organization’s best 
interest to create conditions that allow fathers to be involved at home and at work.”). 
 158. Booz & Company, supra note 108, at 62 (“Women in professional and managerial 
positions generally have more autonomy and control over their daily work schedules, but the 
same principles apply.  If companies are to realize the benefit of their talent investments, 
formal policies and programs are needed to help women stay in the game and maintain a 
career path throughout life’s many phases. These policies may include areas such as 
telecommuting, flextime, and “off-ramp” and “on-ramp” career paths that allow highly 
qualified women to take time off for family obligations without sidelining their opportunities 
for promotion and greater responsibility.”). 
 159. See Siniscalco et al., supra note 92, at 414.  Increased flextime and reduction in 
working hours can result in more sleep for historically high hour workers.  It has been 
estimated that “lack of sleep drains more than $63 billion from the nation’s economy each 
year.”  Id. (citing Amanda MacMillian, Insomnia costs U.S. $63 Billion Annually in Lost 
Productivity, CNN (Sept. 1, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/09/01/health/insomnia-cost-
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Alongside enhanced flextime programs, employer incentives to provide 
some measures of childcare assistance would improve female workforce 
participation.  This can come in the form of tax incentives for employers 
offering childcare services, paid leave for childcare, and childcare cost 
subsidies for their employees.160  Perhaps the most necessary form of 
employer childcare assistance solutions is an adoption of income support or 
paid leave during maternity leave as has been adopted in other OECD 
countries.161  Another alternative for those seeking a more universal solution 
to childcare problems would be the implementation of a quality national day 
care.162  While required paid maternity leave and national day care would 
greatly improve workforce participation incentives for mothers, a more 
modest and effective proposal would be simply incentivizing private, 
employer-funded alternatives.163  
The second prong of employer-focused reforms would be incentives to 
increase female management.  While some countries have required female 
quotas in management,164 history has proven the general American distaste 
for affirmative action programs.  These incentives can be in the form of tax 
credits to organizations that demonstrate increased female management 
participation, and to a lesser degree those organizations demonstrating 
conscious efforts to enable female advancement.  By rewarding both 
employer accomplishment and efforts in female advancement and 
leadership, more organizations will be able and willing to adopt female 
friendly policies.  Examples of employer policies eligible for these tax 
incentives include:  programs to help women who have stepped out of the 
workforce,165 results only work environments,166 and programs designed to 
enhance female management development.167  Adopting these programs will 
help improve the percentage of women in top management positions, thus 
 
productivity/). Flextime could also improve performance by reducing the instance of burnout.  
Siniscalco et al., supra note 92, at 415.  
 160. Booz & Company, supra note 108, at 62; INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 137. 
 161. See INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 137. 
 162. See Heather S. Dixon, National Daycare: A Necessary Precursor to Gender Equality 
with Newfound Promise for Success, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 561, 566 (2005). 
 163. Employer established programs would transform gender relations in individual 
organizations instead of imposing broad one size fits all mandates.   
 164. Norway, Spain, Germany, France, the Netherlands and Switzerland are examples of 
countries that have implemented gender quotas in business management.  See Alison Smale 
& Claire Cain Miller, Germany Sets Gender Quota in Boardrooms, N.Y. TIMES, A1 (Mar. 6, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/07/world/europe/german-law-requires-more-wom 
en-on-corporate-boards.html?r=0.  See also Sullivan, supra note 105.  
 165. McCaffery, supra note 6, at 1033. 
 166. Siniscalco et al., supra note 92, at 415 (“Results Only Work Environments’ employees 
flexibility to decide when, where, and how they work, as long as they get their work done.  
Rigorous studies have demonstrated that ROWE reduces turnover, interruptions at work, and 
unproductive time and increases employees’ sense of job involvement.”).  
 167. Developing female management styles and potential can improve both female 
representation and entity performance.  See supra section III.B and accompanying footnotes. 
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working toward the second goal of the Equal Participation Model.168  
V. CONCLUSION 
As the preceding pages have shown, there are many ways in which the 
Tax Code reflects antiquated gender stereotypes through the current joint 
filing and dependent care credit, stereotypes that no longer reflect the modern 
family structure.169  Moreover, there is evidence that a more balanced family 
structure among spouses and in the workforce can positively impact varying 
sectors of society: women are empowered by increased opportunity, men are 
able to contribute to the family unit and develop additional social skills, 
children are influenced by a more diverse parenting structure, and 
management is enhanced through a more diverse team of employees.170  
Therefore it is not only rational, but also desirable to strive toward the Equal 
Participation Model, where spouses share parental and income producing 
roles in the family unit, and where businesses divide all levels of the 
workforce evenly between men and women.171  Finally, the Tax Code can be 
a positive force for achieving this ideal model by eliminating those outdated 
barriers to equal participation by adopting individual filing for married 
couples and a more neutral dependent care credit among all income strata.172  
By embracing the spirit of these policies, we can continue to move toward a 



















 168. See Slaughter, supra note 1 (“[Some] scholars have concluded that good family policies 
attract better talent, which in turn raises productivity, but that the policies themselves have no 
impact on productivity.”). 
 169. See supra section II and accompanying footnotes.  
 170. See supra section III and accompanying footnotes.  
 171. Id.  
 172. See supra section IV and accompanying footnotes.  
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